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Performance of Savings Groups in Mountainous Laos 
under Shifting Cultivation Stabilization Policy
Fujita Koichi,* Ohno Akihiko,** and Chansathith Chaleunsinh***
The shifting cultivation stabilization policy after the mid-1990s in northern Laos had 
a fundamental impact on rural lives, including an accelerated migration of non-Lao 
ethnic people.  Based on household-level detailed data collected in 2010–11 from 
eight villages in Luang Prabang Province, we analyze first the differential impacts 
of such a policy on different types of villages in terms of location (access to urban 
centers), land endowments, ethnic composition, etc.  Then we examine the role and 
limitations of village-level savings groups (SGs) introduced by an NGO (supported 
by the Lao Women’s Union) from the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century.  It is found that most of the SGs faced difficulties in accumulating savings, 
which resulted in a shortage of funds that could be credited to needy members. 
Money borrowed from SGs is used mainly for medical treatment and consumption. 
It is suggested that income stabilization and diversification is one of the key factors 
that facilitate villagers’ participation in SGs.
Keywords: Laos, savings group, shifting cultivation stabilization policy,  
emergency
I Introduction
In the late 1990s, village savings and credit groups (hereafter savings groups, or SGs) 
were introduced from Northeast Thailand to Laos by NGOs—Foundation for Integrated 
Agricultural and Environmental Management and Community Organizations Develop-
ment Institute of Thailand—with the cooperation of the Lao Women’s Union (LWU), 
first to villages in Vientiane Municipality and later to hinterland areas where the market 
economy was less developed (see Ohno and Fujita, special issue introduction paper). 
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 Raiffeisen’s credit unions in Germany formed the original model for credit unions later 
developed in other areas, including other European nations, the United States, Japan, and 
also Northeast Thailand.  When credit unions were introduced to these other areas, the 
economy—even in rural areas—was already commercialized and had a favorable infra-
structure, which resulted in the successful growth of credit unions.  In contrast, such 
conditions do not exist in Laos.  The rural economy of Laos is still basically subsistence- 
oriented and largely isolated from urban centers due to poor infrastructure.
Luang Prabang Province, which consists mostly of mountainous areas, is a typical 
case.  Until recently, villagers there depended on shifting cultivation under a village-level 
communal land management system, with staple food (rice) being produced for self-
consumption.  Non-rice foods, such as various kinds of vegetables, were collected from 
the surrounding natural environment.  Wild animals and fish were obtained through 
hunting and catching.  Sales of livestock and non-timber forest products largely met the 
area’s cash needs, and rural livelihoods remained basically in a state of self-sufficiency.1)
However, in recent years the situation has gradually changed due to the growing 
population and increased cash needs among inhabitants, which have put pressure on 
natural resources.  At the First National Forestry Conference, held in 1989, deforestation 
was officially identified as a major problem threatening the sustainability and stability of 
natural resource management in Laos (Khamphay and Phouthone 2009).  Besides illegal 
logging, shifting cultivation was identified as a major cause of deforestation.  After the 
conference, a national program for “shifting cultivation stabilization, land use planning 
and land allocation” was launched in 1990 and implemented on a trial basis in Luang 
Prabang and Sayabouly Provinces.  Finally, the Seventh Party Congress in 1994 set a 
policy target to “stabilize” shifting cultivation by 2005 with complete eradication by 2010, 
and donors and international organizations provided financial and technical support for 
implementing the policy in northern Laos (Takahashi and Liang 2010).2)
The land use planning (LUP) program aimed at imposing restrictions on villagers’ 
customary land use rights by introducing land use categories such as “protection forest” 
and “conservation forest.”  Villagers were allowed to continue shifting cultivation only 
in specific land categories.  After a while, the land allocation (LA) program was introduced 
1) There is evidence, however, that the rural economy in Laos was much more commercialized long 
before.  See, for instance, Rigg (2005, 47–50) in general and Yokoyama (2003) in the upstream area 
of the Ou River (upstream of our research area).
2) Whether the practice of shifting cultivation really damages natural resources or not, however, is a 
controversial issue.  Rigg (2005) believes there is not enough rationale for a shifting cultivation 
stabilization policy, saying that “a context is created from which certain development interventions 
are justified and given legitimacy” (ibid., 26).
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and three to five plots of land were equally allocated to every household.  When villagers 
signed the Land Use Agreement,3) they were issued a Temporary Land Use Certificate 
(TLUC)4) for certifying ownership rights.  They were prohibited from cultivating other 
lands.  This implied de facto an introduction of a private landownership system in rural 
Laos.  Villagers traditionally dependent on shifting cultivation in communal land had to 
abandon it and start permanent upland cultivation.  A policy of resettlement of highland 
people to lowland areas was also incorporated in this LUP/LA program.5)
Under such a “forced commercialization” of livelihood in a short period of time, a 
critical question is: how did people adapt to the new policy and institutional environment 
in general, and how could they earn sufficient cash income to purchase rice and other 
necessities in particular, since it appears to have been difficult to produce enough rice 
only in the allocated upland fields?
Migration, especially among non-Lao ethnic people who had hitherto lived in moun-
tainous highland areas, began toward lowland areas, including Vientiane and other cities. 
The movement seemed to occur voluntarily (if not always willingly) but was often accel-
erated by government policy, including the LUP/LA program, because non-Lao people 
lost their major means of livelihood in their original areas.  Many lowland Lao villages 
accepted such migrants.
After the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, almost at the same 
time as the introduction of the LA program, savings groups were introduced in some 
villages in Luang Prabang Province.  Their effect seems to have been rather limited, 
especially compared to the impact of the shifting cultivation stabilization policy, but 
neverthe less rural livelihoods were affected to a certain degree.
The major purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the SGs on rural finance 
and livelihoods in mountainous Laos, where the market economy is less—or least—
developed and the effect of the shifting cultivation stabilization policy is substantial. 
Conclusions are based on an analysis of household-level data collected by the authors in 
2010–11 from several selected villages in Luang Prabang Province.
Not much research on rural finance has been carried out in Laos.  The study by 
3) The agreement contained details on the formal authorization of use rights to the concerned families 
over allocated parcels, with a prohibition on the sale of land and the amount of fines to be paid by 
users if agreements were not followed.  The agreement was signed by the concerned landholder, 
village head, and District Agriculture and Forestry Office.  See Khamphay and Phouthone (2009).
4) The TLUC specified the period of validity for three to five years and was planned to be replaced by 
the Permanent Land Use Certificate, but this procedure was actually not followed (Khamphay and 
Phouthone 2009).
5) For a critique of the shifting cultivation stabilization policy and resettlement policy in Laos, see Rigg 
(2005).
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UNDP and UNCDF (1997) is an important and comprehensive one on rural savings and 
finance.  The researchers covered nearly 3,000 rural households from 129 villages all 
over the country.  Especially notable points in connection with our study are that (1) they 
collected data on non-financial savings such as livestock and precious metals, along 
with financial savings such as cash and bank deposits; and (2) they dealt with “village 
revolving funds” (VRFs) such as rice banks and livestock banks, along with a list of major 
NGOs that initiated VRFs.  They indicated that in the mid-1990s there were about 1,650 
VRFs, of which more than 1,000 were rice banks.
NERI (2003) issued a report on VRFs, based on a questionnaire survey to 142 district 
government offices such as LWU, Lao Youth Union, Agriculture Office, Planning Office, 
Social Welfare and Labour Office, Finance Office, and Agricultural Promotion Bank (APB) 
branch (by special arrangement with the post office).  The number of villages with VRF 
activities reached 2,452, of which the APB branch accounted for 1,231 (50.2%), followed 
by LWU (642; 26.2%).  But in terms of the number of beneficiaries and the amount of 
savings, LWU was the most important, accounting for 31% and 40% of the total, respec-
tively.  The importance of LWU in monitoring VRFs is notable.  It is reported that there 
were 1,203 rice banks, of which 366 (30.4%) were monitored by LWU, and 420 livestock 
banks, of which 124 (29.5%) were monitored by LWU (ibid., 14–15).
NERI and Concern Worldwide Lao PDR (2005) conducted an in-depth study on 
expenditure patterns and saving habits of ethnic minorities in Laos.  Twelve villages from 
six provinces—Hauphanh, Luang Prabang, Khanmmoune, Savannakhet, Saravan, and 
Attapeu—were selected, and a total of 117 households were surveyed.  Focus group 
discussions were also carried out.  Notable findings in connection with our study include 
the following: (1) there was major spending in health care and education, with an average 
of 12.8% of total expenditure going to health care and 5.6% to education (2005, 21); and 
(2) 40.1% of households had no savings, and the major savings of the remaining 60% 
households were in the form of livestock (49.3%), stored grain (23.1%), cash (22.4%), 
precious metals (2.6%), and so on.
The World Food Programme (Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Branch) (2006) 
carried out a comprehensive study, although it focused on food security and related 
vulnerability, not savings and finance.  A total of 398 villages were selected across the 
country, and 3,926 households were surveyed.  One of the most notable findings in 
connec tion with our study is on the coping strategies of households by asset wealth 
(ibid., 115).  The coping strategies are classified into the following: “reduce/change 
food consumption,” “reduce primary expenses,” “wild foods,” “borrow/help from rela-
tives,” “credit,” “labor/migration,” “destructive valorization,” “sales animals/assets,” and 
“savings.”
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Most of the studies mentioned above were conducted before the shifting cultivation 
stabilization policy started to have a strong impact in rural areas.  Our study conducted 
during 2010–11 can shed light on this recent important issue, because the LA policy was 
introduced to our study villages during 1993–2005.  The other major difference of our 
study is that it focuses on SGs transplanted from Northeast Thailand, which are quite 
different from traditional VRFs in that financial savings, not non-financial savings (such 
as rice and livestock), are regularly collected from members and loaned back to needy 
members.  Monetary transactions are much more complicated, and training of some 
women villagers is indispensable.  In this sense, the SG is more “formal” in nature at the 
village level compared to traditional VRFs.
In section 2 of this paper we analyze household-level data to show the basic economic 
structure in the study villages, including population characteristics, landholding and cul-
tivation, rice production and consumption, occupations and income-earning structure, 
and major non-land asset distribution.  The effect of the government’s shifting cultivation 
stabilization policy on rural economy and livelihood is one of the focuses.  In section 3 
we discuss the role and limitations of SGs in the study villages, with special reference to 
coping strategies for health and other risks people face.
II Economic Structure of Study Villages
II-1 Population Characteristics
We selected eight villages in Luang Prabang Province for this study.  Two of them are 
located in suburban Luang Prabang, while the remaining six are along the valley of the 
Ou River in Ngoy District, spread between the towns of Nong Khiaw and Muang Ngoy 
(Fig. 1).
Table 1 is a summary of population characteristics of the villages.  Kogneiw (KN) 
and Xieng Lek (XL) are adjacent to Luang Prabang, while the other villages are in Ngoy 
District.  The six Ngoy District villages are ordered according to their distance from the 
main road (national highway no. 1, hereafter NH1), where Nong Khiaw town is located. 
Sop Houn (SH) village is also located along NH1, Had Sao (HS) is closest to NH1, and 
Had Chan (HC) is closest to the inner town of Muang Ngoy.6)  The villages of SH, HS, 
Sop Khon (SKO), and HC are on the left bank of the Ou River, while Houei Hoi (HH) and 
Sop Khan (SKA) are on its right bank.  There is a connecting dirt road between HS and 
6) Muang Ngoy town was the center of Ngoy District before the construction of NH1.  After the road 
construction, Nong Khiaw town developed rapidly and replaced Muang Ngoy as the center.  Sop 
Houn (SH) is located at the opposite side of Nong Khiaw town, beyond the Ou River.
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NH1.  Another connecting road between SKA and NH1 was completed in 2010,7) which 
improved the communication system for SKA.8)  However, as vehicles are unable to use 
these unpaved roads during the rainy season, boat transportation is still important.  The 
other villages (SKO, HH, and HC) depend solely on boat transportation for communi-
cating with the outer world.  In sum, the rural infrastructure, especially road networks, 
is much better for XL, KN, and SH than for the remaining five villages.  Except for XL 
and KN,9) we conducted a census household survey.10)  The average number of house-
Fig. 1 Map of Luang Prabang Province and Ngoy District
7) The road construction started in 2006.  SKA is located at the end of the road, and there are four 
villages in between before reaching NH1.  The total length of the road is approximately 17 km.  The 
responsibility of road construction was allocated to the five villages, and SKA was responsible for 
5.3 km up to the adjacent village.  The NGO World Vision provided 12 tons of rice to SKA village 
for the road construction and the improvement of irrigation facilities.  Three wooden irrigation weirs 
were substituted by concrete weirs in 2008, and the road was completed in 2010.  The villagers 
basically provided free labor, but they were given rice as wages when they worked hard and inten-
sively.
8) According to several village informants, after the road construction traders often came to the village 
to sell daily necessities and purchase agricultural products.
9) In KN we selected 74 households (39.6%) based on random sampling, because the village size was 
too large (187 households).  In the case of XL, 42 samples were selected from 67 households (62.7%) 
as the major purpose of the survey in the village was to provide training to the survey enumerators 
(university students).
10) However, we failed to cover a few households due to various reasons.
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hold members and labor force per household for 490 households were 5.27 and 2.57, 
respectively.
The people in the study villages consisted mainly of three ethnic groups: Lao, Khmu, 
and Hmong.11)  As Table 2 demonstrates, XL, SH, and SKA are nearly pure Lao villages 
and HC is a nearly pure Khmu village.  The remaining villages are multiethnic.
Table 2 also shows the percentage of households recently (within 15 years before 
our survey in 2010–11) immigrated into each village.  Most of the multiethnic villages 
expanded recently due to the immigration of Khmu and Hmong to Lao-dominated  villages. 
KN is an exception as the village was formed relatively long ago.  Note that HC (a Khmu 
village) also accepted many Khmu immigrants in recent years.
II-2 Land Tenure and Utilization
In the early 1990s the Lao government initiated a program for shifting cultivation stabi-
lization, as mentioned earlier.  Table 3 summarizes the progress of the land allocation 
program in the study villages.  The program was started in the mid-1990s, beginning in 
villages with a favorable infrastructure and followed by remote villages several years 
later.  The program was not implemented in XL village, as this village was relocated to 
the bank of the Mekong River from a more favorable lowland area soon after 1975 by the 
Revolutionary government as penalty for taking sides with the ousted regime.
Our survey reveals that in most cases three plots of land were allocated to each 
household, with the size of a plot varying from 0.5 to 1.5 ha, depending on land endow-
Table 1 Basic Population Information
Village No. of HHs
Average HH Members Average No. of HH Members in Labor Force
Male Female Total Male Female Total
XL 42 2.47 2.52 4.99 1.38 1.36 2.74
KN 74 2.76 2.72 5.48 1.44 1.47 2.91
SH 78 2.86 2.54 5.40 1.37 1.26 2.63
HS 61 2.74 2.69 5.43 1.40 1.23 2.63
HH 44 2.68 2.29 4.97 1.27 1.16 2.43
SKO 62 2.87 2.60 5.47 1.38 1.31 2.69
SKA 75 2.28 2.53 4.81 1.16 1.04 2.20
HC 54 2.78 2.70 5.48 1.19 1.11 2.30
Total 490 2.68 2.59 5.27 1.33 1.24 2.57
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
11) According to the 1995 National Census, the population of Luang Prabang Province comprised Khmu 
(45.9%), Lao (28.6%), Hmong (15.2%), and others (Yokoyama 2003, 7).
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ments in each village.12)  The LA program induced villagers to reduce or stop shifting 
cultivation.  In HS, for instance, before 2005 (when the program was introduced in the 
village) villagers had 7 to 10 plots of land per household, which enabled them to secure 
a sufficient fallow period and an upland rice yield of more than two tons/ha.  However, 
after the program the fallow period was sharply shortened and the rice yield dropped to 
less than one ton/ha.
We surveyed the status of shifting cultivation for each household.  On average, 
36.2% of households never practiced shifting cultivation, 25.8% used to practice it but 
Table 2 Ethnic Composition and Immigrants








XL (Lao) 42 9.5 4.8 7.1 21.4
KN
Lao 19 0 0 0 0
Khmu 43 7.0 7.0 9.3 23.3
Hmong 5 0 20.0 80.0 100
Intermarried 7 0 0 0 0
SH
Lao 75 2.7 1.3 5.3 9.3
Intermarried 3 33.3 0 0 33.3
HS
Lao 23 0 8.7 4.4 13.0
Khmu 26 19.2 50.0 19.2 88.5
Intermarried 11 0 9.1 9.1 18.2
Unknown 1 Unknown
HH
Lao 31 12.9 3.2 12.9 29.0
Khmu 12 58.3 41.7 0 100
Intermarried 1 100 0 0 100
SKO
Lao 15 0 0 0 0
Khmu 40 15.0 20.0 25.0 60.0
Intermarried 7 14.3 0 0 14.3
SKA
Lao 72 5.6 5.6 4.2 15.3
Khmu 1 100 0 0 100
Intermarried 2 0 0 50.0 100
HC
Khmu 47 14.9 6.4 19.1 40.4
Intermarried 7 0 14.3 28.6 42.9
Total 490 9.4 9.2 10.4 29.0
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
12) The exception was HC, where only two plots were allocated due to the limited availability of 
land.
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stopped, and 37% were still practicing it.13)  Households still practicing shifting cultivation 
are generally found more in Ngoy District villages (except SH and SKA).  There is a 
notable difference between ethnic groups.  Among the Lao 52.7% never practiced and 
28.9% have stopped (with only 18.4% still practicing); 62.1% of the Khmu are still prac-
ticing and 27.2% have stopped (with only 10.7% never having practiced); and 80% of the 
Hmong are still practicing and 20% have stopped.
According to the local land categorization, there are mainly three types of land: 
lowland (naa), upland (hai), and garden (suan).  Lowland has been reclaimed by indi-
vidual households14) and is not allocated under the LA program.  It is managed by indi-
vidual households for growing lowland rice.  Table 4 shows the landholding status of 
households for lowland, upland, and garden land.  Land under fallow when we conducted 
our survey was often not reported by the respondents and thereby not recorded in the 
table.  Several important findings can be drawn from the table.
First, there is a large disparity among villages in terms of endowment of lowland, 
although the average area per owner household is almost identical—0.9–1.1 ha.  The 
percentage of lowland owner households is highest in SKA (89.3%), followed by SKO 
(75.8%), SH (65.4%), HH (50%), HS (44.3%), and KN (33.8%).15)  In the case of HC the 
Table 3 Implementation of Land Allocation Program






XL (Lao) Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
KN 1996 NA NA
SH (Lao) 1993 2.05 ha/HH (176 ha/86 HHs) NA
HS 2005 3 plots/HH NA 7–10 plots/HH before allocation
HH 2005 3 plots/HH 1 ha/plot
SKO 2005 3 plots/HH 1–1.5 ha/plot
SKA (Lao) 2005 3 plots/HH 0.5–1 ha/plot
HC (Khmu) 2000 2 plots/HH 0.5–0.75 ha/plot
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
13) We noticed a tendency for respondents to try to hide from us the fact that they were still practicing 
(or even used to practice) shifting cultivation, as they were afraid of the government.
14) Usually, villagers reclaimed lowland fields by manual labor (including hired labor) step by step for 
a fairly long period of time.
15) HH still has substantial room for reclaiming lowland fields, as the villagers just migrated from the 
opposite side of the Ou River in 2000.  By contrast, there is no such room remaining in SKO and 
only a little in SKA.
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percentage is almost nil (3.7%).  The low percentages in HS, KN, and HC seem to reflect 
the composition of ethnicity, because the Khmu and Hmong have traditionally not 
engaged in lowland paddy cultivation.  However, it should also be noted that the per-
centage is quite high among the Khmu in SKO and HH.  The generally assumed relation-
ship between ethnicity and choice of crop cultivation is not necessarily fixed.
Second, naturally, there is a tendency for villages with poorer lowland endowments 
(i.e., HC, KN, HS, and HH) to depend more on the other types of land.  In upland fields, 
many people still grow (upland) rice.  Since each household is allocated three plots of 
land, the villagers usually follow a system in which a two-year fallow period is incorpo-
rated—such as rice-fallow-fallow.  Since they apply no chemical fertilizers to upland field 
(with a few exceptions), at least a two-year fallow period is indispensable.  In the case of 
Table 4 Landholding and Cultivation Area
Village/Ethnic Group No. of HHs



















XL (Lao) 42 0.0 – 2.4 0.80 26.2 1.63
KN 74 33.8 0.97 44.6 1.16 64.9 1.87
SH (Lao) 78 65.4 0.99 16.7 0.73 48.7 1.21
HS 61 44.3 0.99 44.3 0.80 68.9 1.34
HH 44 50.0 1.06 43.2 1.06 40.9 1.23
SKO 62 75.8 0.86 35.5 1.30 29.0 1.38
SKA (Lao) 75 89.3 0.99 25.3 0.80 40.0 1.41
HC (Khmu) 54 3.7 1.00 88.9 0.93 14.8 1.20
Total 490 49.2 0.98 37.1 0.94 43.5 1.41
KN
Lao 19 73.7 0.99 21.1 1.08 78.9 1.86
Khmu 43 23.3 1.00 51.2 1.12 60.5 1.96
Hmong 5 0.0 – 80.0 1.08 40.0 1.50
Intermarried 7 14.3 0.50 42.9 1.67 71.4 1.60
HS
Lao 23 69.6 0.87 21.7 0.56 91.3 1.35
Khmu 26 19.2 0.90 65.4 0.93 57.7 1.31
Intermarried 11 45.5 1.54 36.4 0.58 54.5 1.40
HH
Lao 31 41.9 1.12 45.2 1.17 38.7 1.13
Khmu 12 66.7 1.04 41.7 0.82 54.5 1.40
SKO
Lao 15 86.7 0.94 6.7 1.00 40.0 1.00
Khmu 40 72.5 0.81 47.5 1.33 30.0 1.56
Intermarried 7 85.7 0.93 28.6 1.25 0.0 –
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
Note: Upland and garden in XL were not allocated through LA program. Average area is calculated for only 
landowning households. In the case of lowland, XL is excluded.
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HC, since a household is allocated only two plots, the people have to rent-in another plot 
in order to follow the two-year fallow system.  In fact, our survey in 2011 revealed that 
15 households rented-in a plot from SKA village and paid 150,000–200,000 kip per house-
hold as land rent.
On the other hand, people usually grow cash crops in their garden.  With the excep-
tion of KN,16) when people introduce cash crops such as vegetables and tree crops such 
as teak and fruit, they re-categorize the upland as garden.  In this sense, the percentage 
of households with garden can be a good proxy indicating the extent of agricultural com-
mercialization.  HS (68.9%) recorded the highest figure, followed by SH (48.7%), HH 
(40.9%), SKA (40%), SKO (29.0%), and HC (14.8%).  Table 4 also shows that the Khmu 
attained lower figures in both reclamation of lowland paddy fields and introduction of cash 
crops to upland.  The failure of HC in these two aspects represents a typical case of 
the Khmu people adjusting poorly to the new policy and institutional environment in 
northern Laos.
Table 5 summarizes the status of production and consumption of rice in each village. 
Regarding the per capita annual rice consumption, SKA, SKO, and HH show the high-
est figures—195–250 kg—in contrast with the lower levels—130–170 kg—in the other 
 villages.  The former three villages have a rice surplus at the village level.
Notable here is the large gap in rice consumption among different ethnic groups in 
KN and HS.  However, the cases of HH and SKO are the opposite, probably because 
there was still plenty of land available to be reclaimed for lowland paddy cultivation when 
the non-Lao people immigrated into the villages.
II-3 Income-earning Structure and Non-land Asset Distribution
Table 6 shows household income and its sources.  Income from subsistence rice (pro-
duced and consumed by the same household) is added by imputing it with the prevailing 
rice price in the market.  The major findings are as follows.
First, a large disparity is observed in per capita household income among the  villages. 
XL experiences an extraordinarily high income, mainly because of its handweaving indus-
16) KN is widely known as a “pineapple village.”  Pineapple was introduced to the village before 1977. 
In 2010 a rotational land use system was practiced as follows: in March farmers slashed and burned 
bushes and grasses in the field; in June they sowed upland rice seeds; during July–September they 
carried out monthly weeding before the harvest in October.  In the meantime, pineapple was planted 
in the same field in July.  Harvesting of pineapple starts only after two years.  During the two-year 
period, weeding is repeatedly performed in the field.  Pineapples are harvested during June– 
September, usually for three successive years.  After that, the field is left fallow for two to three 
years before the same cropping cycle starts again or the field is converted to teak plantation.
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try and small trade businesses.17)  The two villages of SH and KN follow.18)  In SH some 
villagers operate guesthouses or restaurants for tourists, which is a major factor in the 
village’s high income.  Pineapple production is the major income source in KN.  Besides, 
salary and wages are important in the three villages due to their proximity to urban 
centers.
Second, per capita income of the remaining five villages ranges from 1.2 million to 
1.8 million kip, except for HC, which records only 815,000 kip.  Note that the important 
income sources of these villages (except HC) are agriculture (both rice and non-rice) and 
livestock.  HC is an exception, depending more on sales of non-timber forest products 
such as chandai (wood of aloe), khem (tiger grass), and mak neng (cardamom).  The HC 
villagers seem to be further impoverished after the LA program, because they failed to 
introduce new cash crops.  The Khmu in HS also suffer an extremely low income.
Education is important when people try to get remunerative non-farm income.  Table 
7-1 illustrates educational status according to age group.
First, most people aged 31–40 (born during 1970–80) did not go to junior high 
school—an average of 65% (especially high at 88% in HH, 82% in HC, 78% in HS, and 
71% in SKA).  On the other hand, more people studied up to senior high school/vocational 
school/university in XL (35%), SH (20%), and KN (14%).
Second, more people aged 21–30 (born during 1980–90) attained higher education. 
The share of people who did not go to junior high school decreased to 46% on average. 
However, the share was still quite high in SKO (75%), HH (73%), HS (71%), and HC 
(69%).
Third, young people aged up to 20 (born after 1990) were more educated in general, 
although many people aged 16–20 decided not to go to junior high school, especially in 
HH (64%), HS (51%), and SKO (40%).  Notable here is the low figure in HC (32%).  HC 
villagers seem to have started investing more in education, but the problem is that all 
the villages along the Ou River have only primary schools.  Parents need to send children 
to Nong Khiaw or Muang Ngoy for junior high school, which requires large expenditure.
Fourth, in all the generations a large gap can be observed among different ethnic 
groups in the multiethnic villages of KN, HS, HH, and SKO (Table 7-2).  The Khmu and 
Hmong in general lag behind in child education; this has serious implications for young 
people in obtaining remunerative non-farm jobs in the future.
17) Since the villagers were forced to move to the bank of the Mekong River without lowland fields, 
they tried to overcome the difficulty by starting a handweaving industry.  Small trade businesses 
were developed after many tourists came into the village to see and buy handwoven products.
18) The per capita income of KN is relatively low, close to the level of SKO and SKA, but in terms of 
cash income KN records a much higher amount.
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Table 8 shows the holding status of livestock and gold, the two major in-kind forms 
of savings in rural Laos.  On average, 10% of households have 3.2 heads of cattle, 38.8% 
of households have 2.6 buffaloes, 40.4% of households have 2.7 pigs, 75.7% of households 
have 20.5 chickens, and 18.6% of households have 2.6 baat (1 baat=15.2 grams) of gold. 
The international price of gold during 2010–11 was around US$40–50 (≒400,000–500,000 
Table 7-1 Education Level by Age Group
Age 
Group Village Population














XL (Lao) 18 0 11.1 83.3 5.6 – – –
KN 44 0 52.3 40.9 6.8 – – –
SH (Lao) 68 0 26.5 58.8 14.7 – – –
HS 40 7.5 72.5 15.0 5.0 – – –
HH 38 10.5 47.4 31.6 10.5 – – –
SKO 44 6.8 43.2 47.7 2.3 – – –
SKA (Lao) 67 3.0 47.8 38.9 10.4 – – –
HC (Khmu) 50 2.0 60.0 34.0 4.0 – – –
Total 369 3.5 46.4 42.0 8.1 – – –
16–20
XL (Lao) 25 4.0 4.0 20.8 56.0 8.0 4.0 4.0
KN 53 3.8 20.8 20.8 45.3 3.8 5.7 0
SH (Lao) 68 0 13.2 22.1 47.1 5.9 8.8 2.9
HS 39 5.1 46.2 23.1 17.9 5.1 2.6 0
HH 25 12.0 52.0 8.0 28.0 0 0 0
SKO 42 7.1 33.3 33.3 26.2 0 0 0
SKA (Lao) 42 2.4 33.3 28.6 35.7 0 0 0
HC (Khmu) 34 5.9 26.5 29.4 32.4 5.9 0 0
Total 328 4.3 27.1 23.9 36.9 3.7 3.4 0.9
21–30
XL (Lao) 60 0 8.3 8.3 35.0 31.7 16.7 0
KN 80 8.8 20.0 18.8 20.0 21.3 8.8 2.5
SH (Lao) 74 6.8 28.4 18.9 17.6 18.9 4.1 5.4
HS 56 23.2 48.2 21.4 3.6 3.6 0 0
HH 33 3.0 69.7 12.1 6.1 3.0 6.1 0
SKO 40 7.5 67.5 15.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 0
SKA (Lao) 54 9.3 40.7 31.5 14.8 1.9 1.9 0
HC (Khmu) 36 8.3 61.1 25.0 0 0 5.6 0
Total 433 8.6 37.6 18.9 14.8 12.7 6.0 1.4
31–40
XL (Lao) 23 4.3 17.4 43.5 21.7 8.7 4.3 0
KN 50 18.0 42.0 26.0 12.0 2.0 0 0
SH (Lao) 49 2.0 44.9 26.5 2.0 14.3 4.1 6.1
HS 32 34.3 43.8 15.6 3.1 3.1 0 0
HH 24 29.2 58.3 12.5 0 0 0 0
SKO 41 19.5 48.8 26.8 4.9 0 0 0
SKA (Lao) 58 1.7 69.0 20.7 6.9 0 1.7 0
HC (Khmu) 34 35.3 47.1 17.6 0 0 0 0
Total 311 16.1 48.6 23.5 6.1 3.5 1.3 1.0
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
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Table 7-2 Education Level by Age Group in Multiethnic Villages
Age 
Group Village Ethnicity Population















Lao 11 0 27.3 45.5 27.3 – – –
Khmu 28 0 60.7 39.3 0 – – –
Hmong 2 0 100 0 0 – – –
Intermarried 3 0 33.3 66.7 0 – – –
HS
Lao 12 0.0 58.3 33.3 8.3 – – –
Khmu 19 10.5 84.2 5.3 0 – – –
Intermarried 8 12.5 62.5 12.5 12.5 – – –
HH
Lao 29 3.4 48.3 34.5 13.8 – – –
Khmu 9 33.3 44.4 22.2 0.0 – – –
SKO
Lao 11 9.1 27.3 63.6 0 – – –
Khmu 31 6.5 51.6 41.9 0 – – –
Intermarried 2 0 0 50.0 50.0 – – –
16–20
KN
Lao 19 0 5.3 0 84.2 5.3 5.3 –
Khmu 27 7.4 18.5 37.0 29.6 3.7 3.7 –
Hmong 5 0 80.0 0 0 0 20.0 –
Intermarried 2 0 50.0 50.0 0 0 0 –
HS
Lao 14 0 35.7 28.6 28.6 7.1 0 –
Khmu 18 5.6 55.6 27.8 0 5.6 5.6 –
Intermarried 7 14.3 42.9 0 42.9 0 0 –
HH
Lao 22 9.1 54.5 9.1 27.3 0 0 –
Khmu 3 33.3 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 –
SKO
Lao 12 8.3 33.3 41.7 16.7 0 0 –
Khmu 26 3.8 34.6 30.8 30.8 0 0 –
Intermarried 4 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0 0 –
21–30
KN
Lao 27 3.7 7.4 11.1 25.9 33.3 18.5 –
Khmu 41 12.2 29.3 17.1 14.6 17.1 4.9 4.9
Hmong 6 0 16.7 50.0 33.3 0 0 –
Intermarried 6 16.7 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 0 –
HS
Lao 18 5.6 38.9 44.4 0 11.1 0 –
Khmu 24 41.7 50.0 8.3 0 0 0 –
Intermarried 14 14.3 57.1 14.3 14.3 0 0 –
HH
Lao 22 4.5 54.5 18.2 9.1 4.5 9.1 –
Khmu 9 0 100 0 0 0 0 –
SKO
Lao 11 18.2 27.3 9.1 27.3 9.1 9.1 –
Khmu 35 5.7 51.4 34.3 8.6 0 0 –
Intermarried 8 12.5 12.5 50.0 25.0 0 0 –
31–40
KN
Lao 10 30.0 20.0 20.0 30.0 0 0 –
Khmu 31 12.9 48.4 29.0 6.5 3.2 0 –
Hmong 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 –
Intermarried 8 12.5 50.0 25.0 12.5 0 0 –
HS
Lao 16 18.8 50.0 25.0 0 6.3 0 –
Khmu 9 77.8 22.2 0 0 0 0 –
Intermarried 6 0 66.7 16.7 16.7 0 0 –
HH
Lao 19 15.8 68.4 15.8 0 0 0 –
Khmu 5 80.0 20.0 0 0 0 0 –
SKO
Lao 12 0 75.0 16.7 8.3 0 0 –
Khmu 25 28.0 40.0 28.0 4.0 0 0 –
Intermarried 4 25.0 25.0 50.0 0 0 0 –
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
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kip) per gram and therefore 6 million–8 million kip per baat.  One baat of gold is more 
valued than a buffalo.  Disparity among villages and households, however, is quite large.
Table 9 is a summary of house type and diffusion of major consumer durables.  It 
more or less corresponds to the per capita income level of each village shown in Table 6.
Table 8 Livestock and Gold Holding
Village/Ethnic Group No. of HHs





















XL (Lao) 42 2.4 10.0 0 – 0 – 40.5 22.6 47.6 4.6
KN 74 0 – 13.5 3.0 18.9 2.6 73.0 27.5 28.4 2.3
SH (Lao) 78 6.4 3.4 44.9 2.5 32.1 2.8 75.6 20.6 30.8 2.5
HS 61 16.4 2.3 49.2 2.3 49.2 3.6 86.9 18.5 13.1 1.5
HH 44 0 – 38.6 2.6 36.4 1.8 70.5 12.2 4.5 1.0
SKO 62 0 – 59.7 2.2 43.5 2.5 67.7 22.3 11.3 1.0
SKA (Lao) 75 13.3 5.7 77.3 3.0 77.3 2.3 96.0 22.5 9.3 1.9
HC (Khmu) 54 44.4 2.1 5.6 2.0 53.7 2.5 83.3 13.9 5.6 1.3
Total 490 10.0 3.2 38.8 2.6 40.4 2.7 75.7 20.5 18.6 2.6
KN
Lao 19 0 – 36.8 3.1 10.5 2.5 94.7 42.3 31.6 4.3
Khmu 43 0 – 7.0 2.7 20.9 2.0 60.5 22.5 32.6 1.6
Hmong 5 0 – 0 – 60.0 4.7 100.0 8.6 0 –
Intermarried 7 0 – 0 – 0 – 71.4 19.0 14.3 1.0
HS
Lao 23 17.4 3.3 78.3 2.6 52.2 4.8 91.3 25.4 21.7 1.8
Khmu 26 7.7 1.5 23.1 1.3 57.7 2.6 84.6 13.6 3.8 1.0
Intermarried 11 27.3 2.0 45.5 2.8 18.2 5.5 81.8 15.8 18.2 1.0
HH
Lao 31 0 – 35.5 3.0 32.3 1.8 80.6 12.4 6.5 1.0
Khmu 12 0 – 50.0 1.8 50.0 1.7 41.7 11.8 0 –
SKO
Lao 15 0 – 73.3 1.7 53.3 2.9 86.7 34.3 13.3 1.0
Khmu 40 0 – 57.5 2.2 42.5 1.9 60.0 17.4 7.5 1.0
Intermarried 7 0 – 42.9 3.7 28.6 6.5 71.4 14.4 28.6 1.0
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
Note: Averages are only for owning households.
Table 9 House Type and Holding of Major Consumer Durables
Village No. of HHs
Share by House Type (%) % of HHs with Consumer Durables
Concrete Semi-concrete Wooden
Cottage 
(Bamboo) Unknown Car Motorbike Bicycle Boat TV Refrigerator
Mobile 
Phone
XL (Lao) 42 64.3 23.8 11.9 0 0 40.5 95.2 61.9 11.9 95.2 95.2 97.6
KN 74 24.3 40.5 27.0 8.1 0 13.5 78.4 60.8 8.1 79.7 47.3 82.4
SH (Lao) 78 25.6 43.6 28.2 2.6 0 6.4 76.9 50.0 14.1 84.6 61.5 92.3
HS 61 19.7 8.2 42.6 27.9 1.6 0 6.6 23.0 41.0 14.8 1.6 37.7
HH 62 3.2 12.9 72.6 11.3 0 2.3 6.8 9.1 43.2 22.7 6.8 29.5
SKO 44 2.3 13.6 72.7 11.4 0 0 4.8 3.2 37.1 12.9 0 27.4
SKA (Lao) 75 4.0 14.7 73.3 8.0 0 2.7 12.0 10.7 26.7 12.0 0 62.7
HC (Khmu) 54 3.7 5.6 74.1 14.8 1.9 0 0 0 20.4 5.6 0 35.2
Total 490 17.3 21.8 50.0 10.4 0.4 7.2 36.2 28.4 24.7 42.0 26.2 59.9
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
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III Role and Limitations of Savings Groups
The savings groups (SGs) originating in Northeast Thailand were introduced to the study 
areas after the early years of the twenty-first century.  According to a staff member of 
the Lao Women’s Union (LWU) in Ngoy District, as of the end of October 2010, 35 of the 
85 villages in the district (41.2%) had already organized SGs.  The establishment of SGs 
in the district was started in 2006 with 3 groups, followed by 29 groups during 2007–08 
(supported by the NGO World Vision) and 3 groups in 2009.
SGs are organized at the village (ban) level, and a few women are selected for train-
ing in accounting, bookkeeping, etc.  The basic system is to collect monthly savings 
(usually a minimum of 5,000 kip per member),19) which is lent back to members who 
request a loan.  Loans are extended for several months at 3–4% monthly interest, though 
the amount of loans cannot exceed five times the savings of the borrowers.  Besides, in 
some “emergency” cases, SG members are entitled to interest-free loans for the first 
month and loans at 3% per month for the succeeding months.20)  Any villagers, including 
males, can be members, but usually only women can borrow.  Normally once a year 70% 
of profit is distributed to members as dividend according to their savings amount.  A part 
of the remaining 30% of profit is set aside for a common fund, such as an “emergency 
fund,” “welfare fund,” etc.  SGs are monitored by the LWU and have a more “formal” 
nature at the village level, so they are a bit different from traditional VRFs such as rice 
banks and livestock banks.
Table 10 shows an overview of SGs in the study villages.  Note that in KN the first 
SG to be established was dissolved due to internal conflicts, and a new one was started 
after a while.  Because of this, many members quit the group.  In SKA, an SG was estab-
lished in 2007 but due to the financial crisis arising from an excess demand for borrowing 
for “emergencies,” it was closed in February 2009; it was reopened in April 2009.
On average, the rate of participation of households is 57.8%.  It varies from 37.8% 
(KN) to 78.6% (XL), indicating no relationship with the degree of economic development 
in each village.  In advanced villages (XL, KN, and SH), however, a clear tendency is 
observed: often more than one member from each household joins.  This indicates that 
people in advanced villages try to utilize SGs as an opportunity to save rather than using 
it as a source of credit.  In contrast, people in backward villages view SGs more as a 
source of credit.
With regard to the influence of ethnicity in the multiethnic villages, some villages 
19) There is usually no upper limit.
20) Some SGs have a regulation that interest-free loans are extended for more than one month until 
borrowers escape from their “emergency” situation.
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(KN and HS) show less active participation of non-Lao people, but in other villages (HH 
and SKO) such a tendency is not observed.  We can tentatively hypothesize that due to 
certain barriers non-Lao ethnic people tend to be alienated from SGs.  This issue will be 
investigated later.
Table 11 demonstrates the accumulated savings in SGs.  Except for XL, the amounts 
of savings remain relatively small, ranging from 170,000 to 400,000 kip per member, even 
though four years or so have passed since the establishment of SGs.  Especially notable 
is the low growth rate in SH despite its relatively high per capita income.21)
Table 12 shows the accumulated number of cases and amounts of borrowing from 
SGs.  The amount of borrowing is on average 598,000 kip, with the most frequent amount 
being 500,000 kip (23.2%), followed by 300,000 kip (16.3%), 200,000 kip (16%), 1 million 
Table 10 Membership of Savings Groups

















XL (Lao) Jul. 2006 42 33 78.6 50 1.52 0
KN Jul. 2006 74 28 37.8 41 1.46 11
SH (Lao) May 2006 78 50 64.1 78 1.56 0
HS Mar. 2007 61 34 55.7 44 1.29 1
HH Jan. 2007 44 33 75.0 35 1.06 0
SKO Jul. 2007 62 42 67.7 43 1.02 0
SKA (Lao) 2007 75 33 44.0 33 1.00 0
HC (Khmu) Jun. 2007 54 30 55.6 30 1.00 0
Total 490 283 57.8 354 1.25 12
KN
Lao 19 8 42.1 11 1.38 7
Khmu 43 14 32.6 21 1.50 4
Hmong 5 1 20.0 1 1.00 0
Intermarried 7 5 71.4 8 1.60 0
HS
Lao 23 15 65.2 18 1.20 0
Khmu 26 12 46.2 17 1.42 1
Intermarried 11 7 63.6 9 1.29 0
HH
Lao 31 22 71.0 22 1.00 0
Khmu 12 10 83.3 12 1.20 0
SKO
Lao 15 10 66.7 10 1.00 0
Khmu 40 28 70.0 29 1.04 0
Intermarried 7 4 57.1 4 1.00 0
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
21) The same tendency is observed in KN, but there might be an influence of the internal conflicts 
among SG members mentioned above.
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kip (13.7%), 100,000 kip (7.2%), 600,000 kip (4.9%), and so on.  The maximum amounts 
are four million kip (two cases; 0.8%) and three million kip (two cases; 0.8%).  The most 
fre quent reason for borrowing is “medical treatment” (44%).  The second-most frequent 
reason is “consumption” (12.5%), followed by “trade and business” (8.8%), “livestock” 
(8.6%), “education” (7.0%), “farming” (4.6%), “purchasing non-food” (3.4%), etc.  The 
fact that more than 55% of borrowing is for either “medical treatment” or “consumption” 
implies that SGs in hinterland areas generally serve as micro-insurance providers rather 
than credit providers for production purposes.22)
Table 11 Savings in Savings Groups







XL (Lao) 42 50 39,428 839
KN 74 41 13,213 322
SH (Lao) 78 78 20,655 268
HS 61 44 10,015 228
HH 44 35 13,955 399
SKO 62 44 11,434 260
SKA (Lao) 75 33 11,220 351
HC (Khmu) 54 30 4,617 171
Total 490 355 124,537 359
KN
Lao 19 11 3,547 322
Khmu 43 21 7,936 378
Hmong 5 1 110 110
Intermarried 7 8 1,620 203
HS
Lao 23 18 4,615 256
Khmu 26 17 3,560 209
Intermarried 11 9 1,840 204
HH
Lao 31 22 10,010 455
Khmu 12 12 3,810 346
SKO
Lao 15 11 2,988 272
Khmu 40 29 7,635 273
Intermarried 7 4 811 203
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
22) We found an informal rotational savings and credit association (houei) in SH for the purpose of 
providing credit for production needs.  Some of the villagers, especially those engaged in businesses 
for tourists, participate in the houei.  They collect 300,000 kip per month, so the size of the houei is 
quite large.  UNDP/UNCDF (1997, 43) pointed out that houei are much more an urban than a rural 
phenomenon.  The case in SH also has an urban nature, in the sense that it is related to businesses 
for tourists.  The other source of credit for production purposes is the Agricultural Promotion Bank 
(APB), but it is found only in villages with favorable access to urban centers.  Our survey of village 
informants, for instance, shows that 27 households in SH borrowed from APB, with an average loan 
size of 5 million kip, and 16 households in HS borrowed from APB, with an average amount of 2.5 
million kip.  The interest rate is 1.2% per month.
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Considering the extreme importance of medical expenditure in utilizing loans from 
SGs, let us now examine how villagers face health risks and other emergencies and how 
they cope with such difficulties, before discussing the role and limitations of SGs.
Table 13 is a summary of the medical expenditure incurred by households.  Medical 
expenditure is divided into two: “large” if exceeding one million kip (approximately 
US$100) per annum and “small” if less than one million kip.
The table shows that, on average, the number of cases of “large” and “small” expendi-
ture in a year reached 0.41 and 0.84 per household respectively.  The average amount of 
expenditure per case is 3.81 million kip for “large” and 242,000 kip for “small” medical 
expenditures.  And the total medical expenditure per annum is quite large: on average 
860 million kip, which is 7–28% of total cash income.
Besides medical treatment, villagers had “unexpected” expenditures for other 
“emergencies.”  Table 14 shows such unexpected expenditures for the two years prior 
to our survey.23)  On average, the expenditure per annum is 5.57 million kip.  The most 
frequent expenses cited are for education (22.2%) followed by childbirth (21.2%), house 
construction (13.2%), poor harvest (11.8%), marriage (11.3%), and death of family mem-
bers (10.4%).24)
Table 15 shows how villagers cope with the needs of both medical and unexpected 
expenditures.  On average, in the case of large medical expenditure, after 53% of the total 
expenditure is covered by villagers’ own savings the gap is filled by property sales (53%), 
borrowing from informal sources (12%), earning extra income (11%), bestowal (11%), 
and borrowing from an SG (9%).  In the case of small medical expenditure, after 70% of 
the total expenditure is covered by villagers’ own savings the gap is filled by property 
sales (27%), earning extra income (24%), borrowing from an SG (20%), and bestowal 
(14%).  Lastly, in the case of unexpected expenditure, after 64% of the total expenditure 
is covered by villagers’ own savings the gap is filled by property sales (52%), earning 
extra income (18%), bestowal (15%), borrowing from informal sources (7%), and bor-
rowing from an SG (4%).  The property most often sold in an emergency is livestock, 
including cattle, buffalo, pig, chicken, etc.  Other properties that are sold include gold, 
teakwood, stored crops, and so on.
In sum, our analysis clearly indicates the limitations of SGs.  Although the major 
purpose of borrowing from an SG is to meet medical expenditure, only a very small frac-
tion of such expenditure (5.2% and 5.9% for large and small medical expenditure, respec-
23) As shown in the table, however, some cases occurred more than two years ago.
24) Although we asked about “unexpected” expenditure, cases are included that can be easily expected 
by villagers, such as house construction and education.  Such occasions have been included since a 
relatively large expenditure is needed and people usually cannot fully prepare for such incidents.
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tively) is actually met by borrowing or withdrawal from an SG.  There is a possibility that 
the role of SGs in meeting medical expenditure will be enhanced in the future if savings 
increase, but in fact the SGs in most of our study villages are not experiencing a smooth 
accumulation of savings.  One of the major problems with SGs is apparently the small 
amount of loans they can provide, especially compared to the cash needs in emergencies 
(Table 16).
SGs can meet the cash needs of small-scale emergencies such as a “small” medical 
treatment, but as Table 15 demonstrates, when such small-scale emergencies do occur 
people do not actually rely heavily on borrowing from SGs, probably because the latter 
have far smaller funds relative to people’s needs.
On the other hand, our survey shows that villagers usually keep substantial amounts 
of cash in hand—almost 300,000 kip on average.  Note that there is no substantial differ-
ence observed among the study villages and also no seasonality in the amount of cash.25) 
Table 13 Medical Expenditures






































XL (Lao) 42 21 6,744 30 236 148,704 3,541 52,344 6.8
KN 74 40 3,020 95 227 142,395 1,924 11,640 16.5
SH (Lao) 78 37 3,608 66 269 151,250 1,939 17,824 10.9
HS 61 22 2,357 63 235 66,635 1,092 6,648 16.4
HH 44 14 3,843 18 257 58,426 1,328 7,069 18.8
SKO 62 30 4,173 50 317 141,068 2,275 9,724 23.4
SKA (Lao) 75 15 4,940 58 175 84,250 1,123 7,777 14.4
HC (Khmu) 54 21 2,870 30 244 67,590 1,252 4,468 28.0
Total 490 200 3,806 410 242 860,318 1,756 13,457 13.0
KN
Lao 19 11 5,000 20 214 59,280 3,120 18,176 17.2
Khmu 43 26 2,388 57 229 75,141 1,747 10,024 17.4
Hmong 5 0 0 7 243 1,701 340 7,739 4.4
Intermarried 7 3 1,233 11 234 6,273 896 15,524 5.8
HS
Lao 23 10 1,985 13 182 22,216 966 9,298 10.4
Khmu 26 8 3,038 35 255 33,229 1,278 5,182 24.7
Intermarried 11 3 1,900 14 245 9,130 830 6,883 12.1
HH
Lao 31 10 2,980 12 204 32,248 1,040 7,989 13.0
Khmu 12 4 6,000 6 363 26,178 2,182 7,587 28.8
SKO
Lao 15 10 7,830 11 354 82,194 5,480 12,137 45.1
Khmu 40 17 2,494 35 296 52,758 1,319 8,726 15.1
Intermarried 7 3 1,500 4 404 6,116 874 18,594 4.7
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
Note: “Large” expenditures entail more than one million kip a year and “small” entail less than one million 
kip.
25) In KN we observed more cash in hand in July and August, mainly because residents had to pay 
school fees.
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The villagers can only borrow from SGs more or less the same amount of their cash in 
hand.
In Ngoy District, World Vision operated rice banks in 28 villages as of March 2010 
(interview at the World Vision Ngoy District Office on March 16, 2010).  Among the study 
villages we find such rice banks in SH, HS, and HC.  Rice banks started in 2006 in SH 
and 2008 in HS and HC, with an initial provision of 2.5–3 tons of rice from World Vision. 
Village managers are appointed, rice is loaned in July–September, and borrowers repay 
the loan the following January with 15–20% interest (making the annual interest rate well 
above 30%).  The average amount of rice borrowed per household is around 100 kg (with 
a value of roughly 400,000 kip).  Rice banks play a similar role to SGs, although their aim 
is to provide rice for home consumption.
“Borrowing from informal sources” and “bestowal” play an important role if people 
have a strong social network.26) The problem here is also the limited amount of money 
for borrowing if people rely on relatives and friends alone.  There are several professional 
moneylenders in Nong Khiaw town, but since they charge 15–20% monthly interest many 
people do not dare to borrow from them.  As already mentioned, the last resort when 
people need a large amount of money is “property sales,” including gold, livestock, and 
even some consumer durables (such as motorbikes).
On the other hand, Table 15 also shows that SGs play an important role, especially 
when people need small medical expenditures.  After meeting a certain portion of the 
necessary expenditure from their own savings, as mentioned above, they borrow 9%, 
19%, and 4% of the balance for large, small, and unexpected expenditures from SGs.  At 
least for meeting small medical expenditures, SGs play an important role.
26) See the third article in this special issue by Ohno and Chansathith.
Table 16 Annual Expenditure for “Emergencies”
Total 
(Cases)











Medical Treatment 641 25.0% 19.3% 11.2% 13.9% 13.1% 10.1% 7.3%
Education 47 0% 10.6% 10.6% 23.4% 12.8% 25.5% 17.0%
Childbirth 44 0% 11.4% 9.1% 29.5% 11.4% 29.5% 9.1%
House Construction 28 0% 0% 7.1% 3.6% 10.7% 21.4% 57.1%
Poor Harvest 24 0% 4.2% 16.7% 16.7% 8.3% 45.8% 8.3%
Marriage 23 0% 0% 0% 8.7% 17.4% 34.8% 39.1%
Death of Family Member 20 0% 0% 5.0% 10.0% 35.0% 10.0% 40.0%
Others 21 0% 14.3% 9.5% 19.0% 19.0% 14.3% 23.8%
Source: Prepared by authors based on household survey in 2010–11.
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How can we facilitate greater participation in SGs, with household participation rates 
being limited to 57.8% on average—ranging from 37.8% (KN) to 78.6% (XL)?  To address 
this question we propose a binary probit model to estimate a household’s decision on 
whether or not to participate in an SG.  A dependent variable is SG membership, which 
is 1 if the respondent household has an SG member and 0 otherwise.  Village-wise results 
are shown in Table 17.
Data show that some variables turn out to be 0 for both members and non-members. 
They are indicated as “NA” in Table 17.  Sometimes a variable has a positive value for 
members but 0 for non-members.  Statistically such variables cannot be included in a 
probit model, because they turn out to be identical with the dependent variable.  However, 
such variables are vital for decision making on whether or not to participate in an SG. 
These cases are indicated as “Z” in the table.
Note that the independent variables “age” and “education” are for household heads 
(“education” is categorized as no schooling, primary school, junior high school, senior 
high school, vocational school, and university).  The “civil servant” and “trader” dummies 
are 1 if there are (at least one) civil servants and/or traders among household members, 
and 0 otherwise.  The “shock” dummy depends on whether the household had unex-
pected expenditure during the last two years prior to our survey.  The non-Lao dummy 
is 1 in the case of non-Lao households and 0 otherwise (including multiethnic house-
holds).  The average figures for the independent variables are shown in Appendix 1.  The 
major findings are as follows.
First, the parameters of the size of labor force are positive and significant for five 
villages among our eight target villages.  This can be interpreted to mean that the higher 
the number of the labor force the more stable (at higher levels) the household income. 
A constant flow of income is assumed to induce households to participate in SGs, since 
it enables households to save every month with ease.
Second, at least one of the livestock parameters, especially that of small livestock 
such as pigs and chickens, is positive and significant except for KN.  This can be inter-
preted to mean that more frequent opportunities to get cash income (from livestock 
activities) enable households to save on a regular basis and hence induce them to par-
ticipate in SGs.  Considering that the loan purpose from SGs associated with livestock is 
negligible (Table 12), obtaining loans for livestock working capital is not a strong motive 
for SG participation.
Third, the parameters of remittance are negative and significant for KN and SH.  It 
can be assumed that remittance offers a safety net against emergencies and hence 
reduces the necessity for SG participation.  Some types of non-farm income may play a 
role similar to remittances.
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Fourth, the parameters of gold are negative and significant in some villages (XL and 
HH).  This can be interpreted to mean that savings in the form of gold functions as a 
substitute for savings in SGs.  In this connection, the positive sign of the parameters of 
livestock mentioned above implies that savings in the form of livestock do not function 
as a substitute for savings in SGs, contrary to the case of gold.
Fifth, the parameters of the non-Lao dummy are generally not significant, and in 
SKO they are even positive and highly significant.  The hypothesis that the non-Lao 
households in multiethnic villages are alienated from SGs is rejected, even in KN and 
HS.
Lastly, note that when we add an indicator for new (less than 15 years) immigration 
to villages as an explanatory variable, the variable does not show significance (not shown 
in Table 17).  The hypothesis that new immigrants are alienated from SGs is also rejected.
IV Conclusion
The savings group (SG) movement was transplanted from Northeast Thailand to Laos in 
the mid-1990s, starting from villages in Vientiane Municipality, one of the most advanced 
rural areas in the country, with a relatively favorable infrastructure.  After several years 
the system was introduced to remote rural areas with a poor infrastructure.  Since the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century it has existed in Luang Prabang 
Province, including the remotest mountainous villages.
From the mid-1990s or a decade later, on the other hand, mountainous rural villages 
in northern Laos experienced a drastic transformation due to the government’s policy 
initiative for shifting cultivation stabilization.  Shifting cultivation based on a communal 
land management system became restricted, and with the introduction of a land allocation 
program rural households were allocated three to five plots of upland.  Their customary 
land use rights were thus negated, and people were prohibited from using other lands for 
cultivation.  They were encouraged to convert the allocated plots to permanent upland 
fields for growing cash crops.  The government also encouraged them to reclaim lowland 
paddy fields.
Such a policy hit rural people, particularly those of non-Lao ethnicity, because, unlike 
the Lao, they had traditionally depended on shifting cultivation and were unfamiliar with 
cash crop production and lowland paddy cultivation.  As a result, migration of non-Lao 
ethnic people accelerated from highland to lowland areas and from upstream to down-
stream areas.  Some people even migrated to urban areas such as Luang Prabang and 
Vientiane.  Others migrated mainly to Lao-dominated villages.
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In this paper, based on data for 490 households collected in 2010–11 from eight vil-
lages in Luang Prabang Province, we first analyze how people responded to the shifting 
cultivation stabilization policy by showing detailed data on their economy and livelihood. 
Then, we focus on the performance of SGs.  Together with the data on how people cope 
with health and other risks we discuss the role and limitations of SGs.
To conclude the paper we will summarize the major points, particularly in relation 
to the performance of SGs in the study villages.
The eight study villages are broadly classified into two categories: advanced villages 
(XL, KN, and SH) and backward villages (HS, HH, SKO, SKA, and HC).  In general, there 
is a sharp contrast between the two groups in almost all aspects, including per capita 
income, rice consumption, occupational diversification, education, house structure, dis-
semination of consumer durables, and non-land assets such as livestock and gold.
It is found that the SGs in the study villages, after their establishment in 2006–07, 
have not experienced smooth growth (measured by accumulated savings), especially in 
backward villages.  The sluggish growth of savings resulted in a shortage of funds to be 
credited to needy members.  The amount of borrowing from SGs is slightly less than 
600,000 kip on average, with the most frequent amount being 500,000 kip (23%), followed 
by 300,000 kip (16%), 200,000 kip (16%), 1 million kip (14%), 100,000 kip (7%), and 
600,000 kip (5%).
Considering that the regular cash in hand among rural households is slightly less 
than 300,000 kip whereas the usual borrowing from rice banks (operated by World Vision) 
is 100 kg of rice, which is roughly equivalent to 400,000 kip, it can be said that the amount 
of borrowing from SGs is basically small.
Since the major reasons for borrowing from SGs are “medical treatment” and “con-
sumption,” SGs function as micro-insurance providers rather than credit providers for 
production purposes.  However, the demand for credit for such purposes, especially for 
medical treatment, is quite large, far exceeding the funds that SGs accumulate.  For 
instance, on average, 410 cases (for 490 households) spent 242,000 kip per year for 
small (with annual expenditure of less than 1 million kip) medical treatment and 200 cases 
spent 3.8 million kip for large medical treatment.  In addition, 212 cases had to spend 5.6 
million kip for other emergencies.  A large part of such necessary expenditures is met 
by villagers’ own savings and sales of property.
However, at the same time, it is found that after meeting a certain portion (53%, 
70%, and 64% for large and small medical expenditures and unexpected expenditure, 
respectively) of the expenditure from their own savings, villagers cover 9%, 19%, and 
4% respectively of the rest by borrowing from SGs.  At least when it comes to small 
medical expenditures SGs do play an important role in funding.
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On the other hand, this study found that the participation rate of rural households 
in SGs is limited to an average of 57.8%—ranging from 37.8% to 78.6%.  In order to 
estimate a household’s decision on whether or not to participate in SGs, we propose a 
binary probit model.  The major findings include the following:
(1) Households with a greater labor force tend to participate more in SGs;
(2) Households with more livestock, especially pigs and chickens, tend to participate 
more in SGs;
(3) Households with remittance income tend to participate less in SGs;
(4) Households with a greater amount of gold tend to participate less in SGs;
(5) The hypothesis that non-Lao ethnic households in the multiethnic villages are 
alienated from SGs is rejected.
The probit analysis indicates that in order to facilitate rural people joining SGs, the 
most important thing is to stabilize their income (at higher levels), in other words to 
enable them to get cash income constantly (smooth the income-earning structure).
The other important factor for facilitating people joining SGs might be an injection 
of seed money from outside.  In the case of rice banks, for instance, NGOs initially provide 
a certain amount of rice stock for starting the banks.  In the case of SGs in Luang Prabang 
Province usually only a small amount of money is provided in the beginning.  Generally 
speaking, SGs are much more cost-saving compared to Grameen Bank-type microfinance 
schemes, so the injection of more seed money can be justified if the money is used effi-
ciently and with transparency.
Finally, the paper identifies several policy agendas for stabilizing or enhancing rural 
livelihoods, especially for the non-Lao ethnic minority.  First, the development of infra-
structure, especially rural roads (connecting to main roads), is vital for facilitating cash 
crop production in allocated upland fields.  Second, programs for improving public health 
are vital for reducing the heavy financial burden on rural people.  Third, given the critical 
importance of higher education for the long-term development of rural economies, seri-
ous consideration should be given to a strategy for financially supporting education expen-
ditures.  Fourth, in villages that still have abundant room for reclaiming lowland fields, 
financial support for accelerating a land reclamation process needs to be considered.
Accepted: December 22, 2014
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